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Abstract 
This research paper assesses the fiscal tolerability of the Thai Social Security Pension Fund to early retirement 
decisions, particularly among the workforce aged 50-54. Starting from 2014, the Social Security Pension Fund 
is due to pay regular monthly pension benefits to eligible insured persons. There has been increasing concern 
over the potentially high proportion of early retirees opting for one-time lump-sum old-age benefits instead of 
the more modest amount of monthly retirement pension. This can create severe shocks to the system. 
Forecasts and sensitivity analyses under alternative scenarios are conducted using an actuarial method. The 
estimation employs the latest 2010 National Economic and Social Development Board population forecast. In 
the worst case scenario, with an early retirement rate of 9 percent or higher per year, the tolerability of the 
system can be maintained for no longer than 25 years from now. The future generations risk facing a situation 
in which the old-age benefits may not be promptly received in the expected amount. This points to the 
important policy precaution that the currently high level of reserves in the Social Security Pension Fund does 
not ensure fiscal sustainability and tolerability as commonly believed. The result also implies that withdrawal 
from the social security pension fund by the government for other purposes is fiscally detrimental to life of the 
fund. 
Keywords: early retirement, pension funds, social security, welfare policy 
1. Introduction and Rationale 
The primary objective of this paper is to assess the fiscal tolerability of the Thai Social Security Pension Fund 
(SSPF) when a “shock” is induced. In the study, the shock refers to the decision to take early retirement of those 
contributors aged between 50-54 years old. Fiscal tolerability is defined as the allowable degree of variation of 
indicators from the past average without causing the system to collapse. Fiscal tolerability points out how much 
worse the system can become and still survive. Survival, in the sense of this paper, refers to the situation where 
the fund has not been completely depleted. Since the Social Security System opens ways for the early retirement 
option, in addition to the fact that some companies provide early retirement incentives for high-salary executives, 
there are many opportunities for early retirement. One of the major current concerns of the Social Security Office 
(SSO) is the potentially large number of early retirees in the coming years starting from 2014. Up to the present, 
there has not been sufficient quantitative research to concretely address the impact this will have. It is, therefore, 
necessary to identify the degree of fiscal tolerability of the fund such that the system can be sustained.  
The second objective as a by-product of the first is to further investigate whether there is really a large fiscal 
space in the SSPF to finance government spending as commonly believed by a number of policymakers. 
Constrained by budgetary gridlocks and political pressure, off-budgetary expenditure and tapping-off from large 
government-managed funds such as the Social Security Fund (SSF) will tend to become novel fiscal tools for 
future governments owing to the lack of discipline revealed in recent historical records and the country’s 
relatively loose legal framework for monitoring and surveillance of usage. In 2011, the reserves for old-age 
benefit amounted to 595,304 million baht, which is approximately 7.4 percent of the country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP). SSF has often been a tempting source of funds with the view that the funds, particularly the 
reserve for the old-age benefit payment within the SSPF, is a very large amount and should not be left “unused”. 
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Based on the past evidence, the SSF has often been the primary target for political manipulation in at least three 
ways; namely; 
1.1 Government’s Contribution Overdue Owing to Excess Government Expenditure on Other Uses 
De jure, the government is obligated to contribute to the fund. However, de facto, such discipline has not been 
strictly enforced. Since 2010 until 2012, the government had a cumulative contribution overdue of over 63,200 
million Baht. There is no guarantee of when the government will pay the principal contribution and the interest 
that has been forgone. 
1.2 Populist Campaigns through Contribution Rate Reduction at the Contributors’ Hidden Costs (I.E., Disturbed 
Cash Flows of the Funds) in the Long-Run 
For example, due to the flood in 2011, the government has released measures to help employers and employees 
through a contribution rate reduction to 2 percent in the first six months and then to 1 percent in the last six 
months of 2012 without government subsidies to assist in the disturbed cash flows of the fund. 
1.3 Withdrawal of Funds to Finance Other Government’s Projects 
For example, 10,000 million baht was drawn out of the SSF, instead of using the government’s own emergency 
expenditure, to provide loans through commercial banks for insured persons to recover from the shelter 
destructions caused by the flood. Aside from these, there have been several attempts to withdraw from the fund 
for a variety of political purposes (Social Security Office, 2012). The predicted cash flows have not been revised 
after these disturbances. 
This paper consists of five sections. The second section provides an overview of the Thai social security system, 
bringing into focus the details of the pension fund within the SSF. The third section discusses relevant theoretical 
concepts in social security finance and modeling. The fourth section details the sources of data. The fifth section 
conducts a fiscal tolerability analysis. Finally, the last section provides policy implications. 
2. Background and Overview of Thailand’s Social Security System 
According to the handbook published by the Thai SSO (2008), the government provision of social security is an 
important principle thatmost countries follow employing one type of social security system or another for their 
citizens from birth till death. The Thai social security system include the following major elements: (1) a 
solidaristic approach, averaging out net costs and benefits, beginning with the formal sector and intended to 
extend the scheme to the informal sector, (2) insurers contribute and are guaranteed benefits at the expense of the 
cumulative reserves in the fund, (3) the contribution is considered a special tax levied on the persons identified 
by the law. The long-term success of the social security system aims at extending to becoming a universal 
coverage scheme in the future. 
The social security system of Thailand refers to the principles stated in Convention Number 102 which was 
adopted by the International Conference of the International Labor Organization (ILO) on 28 June 1952. The 
Convention sets a framework of common important basic social security principles on which any social security 
system should be based to encourage the widest development of social security schemes. The Convention 
defines the nine classical branches of social security and sets minimum standards for each. These social security 
branches include: medical care, sickness benefit, unemployment benefit, old-age benefit, employment injury 
benefit, family benefit, maternity benefit, invalidity benefit and survivors' benefit (ILO, 2012). In Thailand, 
social security is organized into two major funds: the Workmen’s Compensation Fund and the Social Security 
Fund. The latter is the major focus of this paper. 
The Workmen’s Compensation Fund (WCF) is the first step of the social security system in Thailand to provide 
security for employees who are injured or sick from work-related causes. In fact, there were efforts to establish an 
organized social security system in Thailand starting in 1954 but, due to the unfavorable economic conditions, it 
was ineffective. In 1972, the Government of the Revolutionary Party issued a Notification of the Revolutionary 
Party Number 103 dated 16 March 1972 under which a compensation fund was established with the intention to 
protect employees who were ill or injured in relation to performance of work. The employer was required to 
contribute to the fund according to the risk category of their business at the rate of 0.2-2.0 percent. The 
management of the fund started on 1 January 1974 under the supervision of the Department of Labor. In 2011, the 
total number of 338 270 employers registered to pay contributions to the WCF. There were 8222 960 employees 
who were covered for work-related injury and sickness. 
The Social Security Fund (SSF) was established in 1990 under the supervision of the SSO. Initially, the SSF 
covered 4 benefits including injury or sickness, maternity, invalidity and death. Then, the SSO extended the 
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benefits to include child allowance and retirement pension in 1998, and unemployment in 2004. In 2011, there 
were 404,195 enterprises, 71 of which were small enterprises with less than 10 employees. The number of 
insured persons registered with SSF was 10,499,993, covering 27.3 percent of the workforce and 16.4 percent of 
the population. Of those numbers, there were 9,054,535 compulsorily insured persons (Article 33). Most of them 
were between 25-29 years old. There were 1,445,458 voluntarily insured persons under Article 39 who had been 
employed in the enterprises. 
Since 1994, the SSF covered the voluntarily insured persons (Article 40). In 2011, the SSO has developed the 
voluntary social security scheme according to Article 40 to accord with the national implementation of the 10th 
National Economic and Social Development Plan (2007-2011) since 1 May 2011. The insured persons under 
Article 40 were self-employed persons who were not employed in the enterprises under Social Security Act, and 
are not the insured persons under Article 33 and Article 39 (Social Security Office Annual Report, 2011). 
 
Table 1. Contribution rates for insured person under article 30 of the social security act 
Type Benefits 
Contribution Rate Percentage Share of 
Government’s Contribution Employee Employer Government 
4-Benefits Fund Sickness, Maternity, Invalidity, Death 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 33.33% 
2-Benefits Fund Old Age Benefit, Child Allowance 3% 3% 1%* 14.29%* 
Unemployment 
Fund Unemployment Benefits 0.5% 0.5% 0.25% 20.00% 
Total  5% 5% 2.75% 21.57% 
Source: Social Security Office (2008, p. 3); last column calculated by the authors; 
*Government’s contribution only goes to child allowance case. 
 
This paper focuses on the insurance cases under Article 33 which comprises the majority of the insured persons. 
Future research may consider those under Articles 39 and 40 as the scale of the SSF coverage expands. The SSF 
consists of three sub-funds; namely: (1) the 4-benefits fund (sickness, maternity, invalidity and death), (2) the 
2-benefits fund (child allowance and old-age benefits); and (3) the Unemployment Insurance Fund. Under 
normal circumstances, employers and insured persons contribute equally at the total rate of 5 percent of the 
wages; of which 1.5 percent goes to the 4-benefits fund, 3 percent goes to the 2-benefits fund, and 0.5 percent 
goes to the unemployment benefit fund. The government pays contributions at the total rate of 2.75 percent of 
wages; 1.5 percent goes to the 4-benefits, 1 percent goes to 2-benefits fund and 0.25 percent goes to the 
unemployment benefit fund. However, it is important to note that the government’s contribution only goes to the 
child allowance partition of the 2-benefits fund. Hence, in reality, only the employers and employees contribute 
to the old-age benefits. Table 1 shows the contribution rates and the government’s contribution as a share of the 
total contribution by all parties. 
By virtue of the Ministerial Regulation, the contribution rates to the SSF has been reduced from 5 percent to 3 
percent (0.5 percent for 4-benefits fund, 2 percent for 2-benefits fund and 0.5 percent for unemployment fund); 
and 4 percent (0.5 percent for 4-benefit funds, 3 percent for 2-benefits fund and 0.5 percent for unemployment 
insurance fund) during 2012 to help victims of the flood in 2011. Hence, for all employees earning in excess of 
15,000 baht per month, their contributions decreased from 750 baht to 450 baht per month during January 
through June 2012; and 600 baht per month during July through December 2012. 
It was expected that from January 2013, the contribution rate to the SSF will be resumed at 5 percent. However, 
this was not so as the government’s pre-election 300-baht minimum wage campaign became effective. In order to 
relieve the burden on employers from the increased minimum daily wage policy, the Board of the SSF approved a 
year’s extension of the reduction in the Social Security contribution rate. This was further evidence of the disturbed 
cash flows of the SSF caused by discretionary policies. 
In terms of investment performance, as of 31 December 2011, the total investment amount of the SSF was 
883,423.92 million baht. Of these, 755,544.91 million baht was in the 2-benefits fund; 67,394.36 million baht 
was in the 4-benefits fund and 67,394.36 million baht was in the unemployment fund. The rest of the investment 
amounting to 262.24 million baht is the fund for voluntarily insured persons under Article 40. In 2011, the SSF 
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has received investment income amounting to 36,062 million baht consisting of: (1) interest income received 
from bank deposits, bonds, and debentures amounting to 29,295 million baht and (2) dividends and profits from 
the sale of common stocks amounting to 6,767 million baht. The average investment return during the past five 
years was approximately 5 percent. Due to the large amount of pension reserves, politicians often consider it as a 
resource for financing other expenditures. However, it is important to note that, by the end of 2014, the fund will 
have to start paying pension benefits to insured persons who worked for at least 180 months. The analysis in the 
next section shows that the fund’s expenditure will be sensitive to decisions on early retirement. To recall, the 
government often reduces contribution rates from time to time; hence, adversely affecting cash flows. Moreover, 
past overdue repayments by the government have neglected the forgone interest. Thus, the actual situation could 
have been more severe than the baseline scenario to be presented in this paper. The following sections explain 
the theoretical framework, while section 5 presents the optimistic baseline scenario when unexpected shocks are 
induced. The last section provides some precautionary notes on interfering with the uses of the fund. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1 General Social Security Finance 
The analytical framework is the application of the basics of social security actuarial mathematics in Iyer (1999, p. 
15). These basics had been commonly employed by most ILO studies related to state or government-managed 
pension schemes with an infinite interval. Under such systems, the major theoretical assumption is that the 
number of contributors to the national fund will consistently increase into the indefinite future. Hence, the social 
security pension scheme in this hypothetical framework is open-ended, which is analogous to the assumption 
that the first generation of contributors will be identical to the future generation of contributors. 
The framework for analyzing the sustainability of a pension scheme at time t consists of the expenditure function, 
B(t), which comprises of payments of benefits to contributors, the insured salary function, S(t), the contribution 
rate function, C(t), implying the type of fund, the reserves function, V(t), which is the difference between inflows 
and outflows subject to the rate of return, . The relationship between each function can be represented by the 
differential equation in equation (1) 
         dttBdttStCdttVtdV                               (1) 
In other words, the change in reserves during time t equals revenue from cumulative contribution plus the excess 
of current contributions received after deduction of the benefits paid out in the same period. 
Integrating equation (1) over the interval (n, m), gives the relationship between reserves at t=n and t=m as shown 
in equation (2) 
           dtetBtStCenVemV tm
n
nm                              (2) 
From Equation (2), V(m) can be rewritten as in equation (3) 
              dtetBtStCenVmV m
n
tmnm                              (3) 
If n = 0 and assuming V(0) = 0 the retrospective equation for V(m) can be represented by equation (4) 
         dtetBtStCemV m tm   
0
                              (4) 
The equilibrium for the whole period of the pension scheme can be represented by the equivalence between the 
present values of revenue and expenditure. The equation can be written by assuming present value of future 
contribution equals the present value of future benefits as in equation (5) 






tB dtedtetStC tt                                (5) 
In equation (5), it is assumed that the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the equation will converge under 
the condition that during the beginning stage the ratio B’(t)/S’(t) increases from zero until a certain period of 
time, say t = t*, at which time the ratio becomes constant. At t = t*, the scheme will have reached its financial 
maturity. In most cases, population maturity will be reached before financial maturity. However, if the earlier 
generation has been paid relatively higher benefits, financial maturity will be reached earlier. At financial 
maturity, B’(t)/B(t) = S’(t)/S(t) =  +  at time t ≥ t*, where  is the growth rate of the numbers of contributors 
www.ccsenet.org/ass Asian Social Science Vol. 10, No. 8; 2014 
178 
 
and  is the growth rate of insured salary. 
Equation (5) constitutes the basic equation for considering pension schemes which will be implemented by a 
government, implying equation (6) 








                         (6) 
Substituting equation (4) into equation (6) leads to equation (7), which is a prospective equation 
          
m
tm dtetStCtBemV                                (7) 
Theoretically, from the beginning of the scheme, it can be observed that the contribution function, C(t), in any 
form that solves for the equilibrium function in equation (5) and having reserves derived from equations (4) or (7) 
will be a scheme that is considered sustainable in the long-run. 
However, in practice, it is necessary to introduce the conditions for C(t) and V(t) since, if C(t) is negative, it 
implies that the scheme is, on the net effect, paying back to the contributors. Alternatively, if V(t) is negative, it 
means that the scheme is accumulating liabilities in paying benefits to the contributors. Hence, in practice, it is 
necessary to set the conditions that C(t)≥ 0 and/or V(t)≥ 0 for all time periods t. By imposing such conditions and 
other conditions will lead to the determination of various national pension schemes in different countries. The 
following section introduces the set of condition imposed to suit the analysis of the social security pension 
scheme in Thailand. 
3.2 General Average Premium Systems 
In Thailand, the social security pension fund has the characteristic of a General Average Premium System 
(GAPS) in which all members of the fund pay a single contribution rate of 5 percent of their salary. The 
minimum salary is 1,650 baht and the maximum limit of the salary subject to social security payment is 15,000 
baht. For instance, a person with salary higher than 15,000 baht, say 100,000 baht will contribute only 5 percent 
of 15,000 baht. In GAPS, at time t=m, letting C(t) =C (a constant) in equation (7) leads to equation (8) during 
the period (m, ∞) 















                                    (8) 
In other words, the contribution rate equals the present value of benefits after deduction of reserves divided by 
insured salary during the period. To attain equilibrium in the system from the beginning of the scheme, equation 
















                                       (9) 
For simplification, the contribution rate in equation (9) can be viewed as the average contribution between two 
groups of the population. The first group represents the first generation of contributors. The second group can be 
hypothesized as the future generation of contributors. Assume that B(t) = B1(t) + B2(t) and S(t) = S1(t) + S2(t), 
where B1(t) and S1(t) are benefits and insured salary for the first group; and B2(t) and S2(t) are the benefits and 
insured salary for the second group. Calculating the Average Premium (AP) for the two groups yields equations 
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Hence, for this system of pension scheme, GAP can be rewritten as in equation (12). Conceptually, GAP may be 
viewed as the weighted average between AP1 and AP2 




















                          (12) 
With a lower number of contributors relative to benefit receivers in the first stage, equations (10) and (11) imply 
that the contribution rate for the first group must be higher than the second group. Hence, the relationship in (13) 
must hold. 
AP1 > GAP > AP2                                        (13) 
The above equations show that in a pension scheme with a single rate during period t, it is important that the first 
group of the population pay higher contribution rates in order to make the fund sustainable. Then, later on, when 
the second group of the population joins the scheme, the rate can be reduced and equilibrium can be attained. 
Hence, theoretically, such a system will be able to accumulate sufficient reserves. The practical implication is 
that, in GAPS, despite the ease of management, the setback is that if the contribution and ceiling salary are 
inappropriate, the accumulation of cash inflows will be lower than pensions benefit payment at the time of 
population maturity. Although in the beginning, there seems to be net inflows to the fund, it is because the full 
benefit payment has not yet been realized. In Thailand, the SSPF will start paying regular monthly pensions in 
2014. Once the payments have started along with early retirement lump-sum payment obligations, the simulation 
in the next section illustrates that the reserves have the potential to be used up in due course. 
4. Indications of Data and Assumptions 
There are several ways to do the forecasting of the population in the Social Security System, namely; actuarial 
methods, econometric methods or mixed methods. The actuarial method considers the internal factors and has 
been employed for a long time in insurance industries and social security system analyses (Iyer, 1999, p. 65). 
Econometrics is an extrapolation of the past trend through regression analysis. That is, it takes into account the 
external factors. This paper employs the actuarial method. The forecast for the population in the Social Security 
System for the period 2012-2060 is based on the latest Office of National Economic and Social Development 
Board’s (NESDB) 2010 forecast of the Thai population by age and sex under the following assumptions: 
1) Fertility Assumptions 
Degree of fertility: The forecast assumes that in 2010, which is the base year, the total fertility rate is 1.62 
percent. After that, the rate remains constant at 1.62 percent during the first five years and gradually decline to 
1.30 percent in 2050. 
Fertility pattern: During the period of the forecast, the fertility pattern follows that during 2005-2010. 
Sex Ratio at Birth: The female: male ratio is 105:100 during the whole period of the forecast. 
2) Mortality Assumptions 
Degree of mortality: The average age of mortality for men increased from 70.34 years in 2010 to 75.25 years in 
2050. The average age of mortality for women increases from 77.47 years in 2010 to 81.86 years in 2050. 
Survival Rate: The survival rate is calculated from the Life Table built upon by the Relational logic model using 
mortality patterns by age during 1999-2010, in which the relative ratio complies with the average age. 
3) Migration Assumptions 
Since there is no legal migration, or even if there is, the effect is minimal and will not impact the age and sex 
structure of the population. 
In 2011, the number of the insured persons registered with the Thai SSF was 10 499 993, covering 27.3 percent 
of the workforce and 16.4 percent of the population. The past statistics of the unemployment rate during the past 
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10 years did not vary significantly around the rate of 1.6 percent. The increase in population during the same 
period was approximately 0.6 percent (World Development Indicator, 2010). In addition, the increase in 
workforce is relatively constant remaining at around 2 percent and the increase in number of SSF insured 
persons is around 2.6 percent per year. 
In the next step, theoretical analysis relies on the probability and risks such as the risk of not surviving until the 
end of the period, the risk of disability, the risk of stop working during the period and the risk of early retirement 
each year, etc. Iyer (1999, p. 66) explains that the forecast can depend on a matrix which comprises of chain 
multiplication: nt = nt-1Qt-1 where nt is the row vector comprising of insured persons (e.g., workers, pensioners, 
disability beneficiaries, etc.) at time t and Qt-1 is the square matrix comprising of risks of changes in status of the 
insured person during period (t-1, t). 
In the forecast of SSF population, the calculation is based on the population forecast by NESDB which has 
already integrated the risks from the Life Table using relational logic model for ages of different cohort. 
However, an alternative source of Life Table can be obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO) Life 
Table 2010 and the results vary slightly. Other risks can be taken into consideration in the future models. 
However, this awaits a more detailed life table for Thailand. Aside the major statistics from the SSO and 
NESDB’s population forecast, other macroeconomic statistics are obtained from Mahidol University Institute for 
Population and Social Research, World Development Indicators 2010, Fiscal Policy Office and the Bank of 
Thailand. 
5. Fiscal Tolerability Analysis 
The analysis focuses on the 2-benefits fund (the old-age benefits and child allowance) which has the highest 
amount of reserves among the three sub-funds within the SSF as earlier indicated in this paper. Within the 
2-benefits fund itself, the amount is separated for the two purposes. The government’s contribution only goes to 
the child allowance and does not contribute to the old-age benefit. Therefore, this analysis only focuses on the 
reserves for the old-age benefits which only come from the contributions of the employers and employees. The 
4-benefits fund also has problems of its own; but these problems are not within the scope of this paper. In 
contrast to the other sub-funds which provide year-on-year benefits only during work life with the excess not 
accumulated for the insured person but going to the reserves for SSF’s other expenditures, the pension fund has 
long-run impacts for the insured persons during old age after retirement. From equation (4), the function can be 
applied to the analysis during period t0 to t1 to calculate the cumulative liability of the fund reserves, (t), in 
equation (14) which is the ratio of net present value of cumulative reserve after deduction of benefits paid over 
the net present value of total cumulative reserves. Ratio calculation gives a relatively unbiased estimation of the 
direction than unit calculation 
 
      























                             (14) 
In equation (14), the subscripts  and  denote sex and age group at time t, respectively. Since the SSF employs 
GAPS, the contribution rate to the old-age benefit fund is 3 percent for all employers and employees as shown in 
Table 1. Hence, C(t) = Cp = 0.03. The denominator in equation (14) is multiplied by 2 because the 
contributions come from both the employers and employees. Equation (14) can be re-expressed in equation (15) 
 























t                             (15) 
In the baseline scenario analysis, the following assumptions are made. 
1) The average working age starts at 22 (after bachelor’s degree). 
2) No insured person will encounter disability 
3) No formal/informal sector migration 
4) No international migration 
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5) Ceiling insured salary is 15,000 Baht 
6) The insured salary increases at the rate of 1.2 percent per year in line with the past average inflation. 
7) No inflation adjustment in benefit and contribution rates throughout the period. The rates are based on those 
of Table 1. 
8) No benefit payment after death (this may lead to under-estimation of benefit payments) 
9) The discount rate is 2.6 percent throughout the period (past five-year average) 
10) Returns from investment of SSF is 5 percent (based on average returns in the past) 
11) Administrative costs is 10 percent (based on SSO annual reports) 
12) There are only two risks in the model. The first is death during the beginning and the end of the year each 
year (this has already been integrated in the demographic forecast). The second risk is early retirement, 
parameterized in the model, which can create a shock to the system. 
13) Based on the SSF requirements, insured persons must be at the age of 55 and must have contributed to the 
SSF for at least 15 years to be entitled to monthly pension benefits after retirement. The monthly pension rate is 
20 percent of the average salary during the last 60 months of contribution. Each additional working year is 
topped up by 1.5 percent per year. 
14) During each year throughout the period, 60 percent of the insured persons retiring at the age of 55 are 
eligible for monthly pension benefits. 
 
Table 2. Years net liability begins and years pension fund depleted under various early retirement rates 
Early Retirement Rate 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
Year liability begins 2024 2023 2022 2020 2019 2017 2016 2015 2014 2014
Year pension fund 
depleted 2050 2048 2046 2045 2044 2043 2042 2041 2039 2038 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
Under the baseline scenario, given that 1 percent of the potential early retirees (aged 50-54) opt to exit the labor 
market, Table 2 shows that the net liability will be borne in the year 2024, ten years from now; and from then the 
fund will begin to use its reserves. Under the given scenario, the reserves fund will be depleted in 2050 which is 
less than 40 years from now. The analysis then goes on to observe the degree of fiscal tolerability of the SSF to 
changes in retirement decisions among the potential early retirees. During the past decades, older workers tend to 
be motivated toward early retirement from the formal sector due to various incentives given by the private sector 
to employ younger generation with lower pay. Moreover, some insured persons may intentionally wish to retire 
early at the age of 54 or before they have been working for 15 years in order to gain the one-time lump-sum 
amount to carry on their own personal investment or consumption in old-age instead of a more modest amount of 
monthly pension. 
Currently, there have been considerable concerns over the early retirement of older workers and its impact on the 
funds’ reserves starting from 2014. The sensitivity analysis in this paper fills up the gap in research by 
identifying the critical point of how the system can be maintained given such shocks. From Table 2, it can be 
observed that as the percentage of early retirement increases by 1 percent, the year that the fund becomes 
depleted moves earlier by one or two years. It is, however, important to note that if the early retirement rate 
among elder workforce increases to 9 percent, the system will incur liability right away in 2014. This means that 
the system can become unsustainable since benefits exceed contributions at the start. Nevertheless, the system 
can go on or “tolerate” until the fund will become fully depleted in 2039, which is 11 years earlier than that of 
the baseline scenario. That is, once the net liability occurs, the system can maintain itself for at most 25 years. If 
this is the case, policy measures that impact the reserves can be considered critical and policymakers should take 
precautions if they wish to change any parameter. 
The social security pension fund can, of course, also be adversely affected by worse case scenarios such as a 
reduction in investment returns or large payouts during economic recession. Without official intervention, there 
can already be several natural changes to the parameters such as discount rates, returns from investment, and 
growth of insured salary, etc. Moreover, in reality, policy changes in SSF governed by external factors have been 
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very customary. For example, previously, the contribution rate has been reduced to alleviate several crises. 
Nevertheless, despite some slight changes in macroeconomic variables, the result can vary around 3-5 years. 
This should not alter the general conclusion and the trend of the analysis. 
The results of the analysis show that, given the current system of defined pension benefit in Thailand, later 
generations face the risk of not receiving old-age benefits in a full amount upon retirement. There is also 
asymmetric information of not knowing when the contribution rate will change and what the SSO’s long-term 
plan is, subject to political decisions. In such an open-ended fund managed by the government, it is important 
that the initial rates should be higher to attain long-run equilibrium. However, imposing such a policy can be 
politically unpopular. International experience reveals that common solutions include increasing retirement age, 
reducing benefit rates, increasing contribution rates or changing of the system, for example, to become a defined 
contribution system (Asher & Nandy, 2008; Berkel & Borsch-Supan, 2004; Blundell, Meghir, & Smith, 2002; 
Borsch-Supan & Schnabel, 1998; Giang, 2008). This is a sensitive policy issue, particular in the midst of the 
current political situation in Thailand. The outcome requires wider public discussion of how the Thai social 
security pension should be managed or even reformed. 
6. Policy Implications 
Given the results of this paper, illustrating how vulnerable the system of the Thai social security pension is to the 
early retirement decision parameter, in the short-run, the research suggests that appropriate contribution and 
benefit rates should be reconsidered. The GAPS requires that the contribution rate should be adjusted 
accordingly. However, contributors must be explicitly informed of their contribution pattern throughout their 
working life time. In other words, changes in the rates should not come as a surprise. In Thailand, there has been 
some studies on measures to extend the life of the fund. For example, Thailand Development Research Institute 
(2008) suggests the extension of the retirement age similar to many other countries. However, this issue is still a 
matter of public debate in Thai society. Up to date, the retirement for the SSF remains at 55 years. Moreover, a 
retirement age extension can only prolong the life of the fund but the tolerability problem persists. 
In the long-run, if the rates cannot be adjusted to a sustainable level due to political constraints, along with an 
increasing demographic dependency ratio, this paper suggests a reconsideration of the type of pension scheme 
for the Thai society. Possible alternatives can be the defined contribution system, or notionally defined 
contribution system which can calculate returns by the net present value of contributions plus returns on 
investment. However, the transparency in policy-making, the disciplines in the fund management, and the uses 
of funds are also serious issues of concern for the Thai working population paying social security taxes and 
income taxes. Regarding the larger picture of the country’s public finance, the pension fund has often been the 
target source for political extractions. This paper portrays a scenario which indicates whether there is a space for 
political maneuvering in this corner of the public sector as commonly believed by a number of policymakers. 
Henceforth, with the possibility of the depletion of the funds within 25 years from now or earlier if the degree 
of early retirement gets higher, the future generations risk facing the situation in which the old-age benefits 
may not be promptly received in the promised amount. This pinpoints the important policy precautions that, 
although currently there are high reserves in the pension funds, withdrawal of this money by the government 
for other purposes can be fiscally detrimental to the sustainability and tolerability of the fund. 
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